Algeria - Historical Lessons on How to Loose a Winnable War

5th July marks Algeria’s Independence day, the anniversary of when the French were finally defeated by a weak and disorganised insurgency force. The US, Britain and its allies would be wise to look at the events of Algeria’s war with France as a reminder and warning that even with superior military manpower and equipment, a victory is unlikely in counterinsurgency warfare without the vital ingredient of winning over the local population – gaining their hearts and minds. By putting tactical short term gains ahead of a precise strategic aim makes achieving a favourable outcome exceptionally difficult.

There is often a misconception that the Algerians defeated the French militarily; this was not necessarily the case. The war brought about military successes for the French – not least in the battle for Algiers when Massau’s 10th Paratroop Division swept aside its opposition, capturing or killing many of the leaders of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in the process. The French had adapted their operations around the need for gathering intelligence and on the strength of this, deploy elite mobile units to strike (sounds familiar?). However, the way these successes were achieved - the brutality of the French military, the use of torture, the disappearance of thousands in detention and the relocation of millions - attracted international condemnation.

Although the French military had managed to pacify the country, they had lost support at home and within Algeria and failed to understand that counterinsurgency operations are overwhelmingly political. The military can not be given authority over the civilian governing power. Because the will to win in Algeria was so strong, the political elite were willing to allow the military to operate without the limitation of moral restraint or political obligation.

Similarly, this approach meant that there was no overall plan which could include and unite all necessary players in a counterinsurgent operation – the civil authorities, military commanders, the intelligence community and the police. The military decided to rely on force and fear. Allowed to operate free of political and ethical constraints, the army was able to mirror those brutalities served by the FLN. Furthermore, by allowing the military supreme power, the tactical direction of the army became more important than the overall strategic aim of what they were fighting for.

Once war breaks out, being able to distribute positive propaganda can be as important as the weapons used in the fight. By exploiting the moral question of the use of torture, the FLN was able to direct negative propaganda against the French military, not only within Algeria but also in France and the greater international stage thus ensuring victory in the political and propaganda war.

The fact that the Algerians managed to defeat the French without ever getting close to moving into insurgency’s Phase III was more the fault of the French rather than the military brilliance of the FLN and its leadership. The history of French Algeria as well as the supremacy of the French troops should have given the authorities enough political clout to defeat the Algerian uprising quickly and decisively.

By acting in an immoral way, they failed to observe the first counterinsurgency principle - that of maintaining legitimacy. By allowing the military to operate without the usual ethical restraints, support was lost.

I am not trying to say that in Afghanistan, the allies are using torture or that the boundaries of legality are being crossed. Similarly, it is likely that the human rights abuses carried out by US forces in Abu Ghraib prison were exceptions rather than the rules. However, this anniversary should serve as a reminder to our political and military leaders that every time allied air strikes are anything less than surgically precise, every innocent killed in a night time raid to neutralise Taliban fighters or TV pictures coming from Guantanamo Bay all help to erode support and give the insurgents the tools needed to promulgate their propaganda. History proves that counterinsurgency warfare relies on winning over the population and this should be the strategic objective in Afghanistan and anywhere else we may find ourselves fighting in the future.

Ecrivain Man